Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) was signed in 1972, the Vladivostok
Accords - in 1974, the Helsinki Agreement - in 1975, and SALT II - in 1979
(SALT II was never ratified by the Congress).
At the same time the more serious doubts about mutual assured
destruction strategy (MAD) arose. Early in 1974, President Nixon signed
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242. This was the shift of
emphasis away from the MAD strike options in the strategic war plans toward
more limited and flexible options designed to control escalation and
neutralize any Soviet advantage.[36]
Another important issue was China. During the late 1960s, both Nixon
and Kissinger had reached the conclusion that it would not be wise to leave
China permanently isolated.[37] Also it became clear that the split between
the SU and the China was real.[38] Recognition of the People’s Republic of
China and full diplomatic relations with the Beijing goverment took effect
on January 1, 1979.
Carter came into office in January 1977. In general, the Carter
administration continued the same strategy as Nixon. But some changes were
introduced. The Carter administration emphasized a more global agenda,
concentrating on regional issues, the North-South relationship, the
economic interdependence of the industrial democracies, and human rights.
Another important departure was a renewed emphasis on moralism in US
policy.[39]
The end of detente was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979. Ronald Sullivan pointed out: “The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
finally closed the door on the policy experiment known as detente.”[40]
5. Confrontation, 1979-1986. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan opened the new period of the US-Soviet relations. Confrontation rather than accomodation had once again become the dominant mode of interaction between the superpowers.[41]
Even before that the first signs of confrontation appeared. Carter
Doctrine (1979) declared: “an attempt by any outside force to gain control
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the USA.”[42] So, the invasion was regarded as an assault.
Carter Doctrine also underlined the importance of Rapid Deployment Force
(RDF), which was created in December 1979.
In 1981 Ronald Reagan assumed office. His administration began to pursue much more anti-Communist policy. The keys to the Reagan foreign policy were to be: military and economic revitalization, revival of alliances, stable progress in the Third World, and a firm Soviet policy based on Russian reciprocity and restraint.[43]
In March 1983 President Reagan announced Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), also known as “Star Wars”. The US shifted the focus from offense to
defense. The new strategy suggested a profound shift in US nuclear strategy
away from reliance on offensive missiles to deter an attack - that is, from
dependence on MAD, which Reagan deemed “morally unacceptable.”[44]
The new strategy led to a major increase in defense spending. Real
spending in fiscal year 1985 was over 50 per cent greater than in fiscal
year 1980.[45] Reagan administration also focused its atention on regional
problems. In 1983, a new joint service command - CENTCOM - was established
to deal specifically with contingents in Southwest Asia. By early 1986, a
new element of strategy informally known as the “Reagan Doctrine” had
appeared. This policy sought to roll back Soviet and Cuban gains in the
Third World by active support of liberation movements in areas such as
Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan.[46]
During this period the relations between the superpowers were highly
escalated. But situation changed when Gorbachev came to power in the SU in
1985.
Ending the Cold War, 1987-1990.
Gorbachev’s ‘Novoye Myshlenniye’ or New Thinking in international
affairs was first spelt out at the Geneva summit with President Reagan in
October 1985, when they agreed in principle to work towards a Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty to cut their nuclear arsenals in half.[47]
Probably the most radical summit was the Reykjavik summit in October
1986. Despite that fact that no agreement was signed, “it succeeded beyond
the limited horizons of diplomats and arms controllers in that it shocked
the US-Soviet negotiations into a wholly new dimension. The old ground
rules of superpower poker, of incremental gains and minimal concessions,
had been ripped up.”[48] In fact, both Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the
posibility of nuclear free world. More, they both made it their major
mutual goal.
The real agreement was reached at the Washington summit in December
1987. The US and the SU signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
and formalized their commitment to a 50 per cent reduction in strategic
offensive arms.[49] “The signing of the INF Treaty signalled an end to the
New Cold War.”[50]
Following a meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet
Foreign Minister Schevardnadze in Wyoming in September, Secretary Baker
suggested that the “era of containment” had perhaps come to an end.[51]
Then followed the Malta summit in December 1989, where President Bush
and Gorbachev recognized common interests in maintaining stability in the
midst of revolutionary political changes and were even explicit about
accepting each others legitimate security interests and role in preserving
European security.[52]
The end of the Cold War solved one great problem for the US - the
nuclear threat from the Soviet side was eliminated. But it caused a series
of other problems. “The Cold War ended wih the US and Britain in recession,
the Japanese stock market tumbling by 40 per cent, with the wealth of
Germany devoted to the rescue of its reunited compatriots, and the world
poised for war in the Persian Gulf.[53]
The Post-Cold War Era, 1991 onwards.
With the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the dissolution of the SU after the failed coup, August 1991, the US faced the another problem - the lack of a coherent American foreign policy. There is no clear consensus in the US over the threats to the security and economic well-being of the US.[54]
Bush administration’s emphasis was on prudence and pragmatism. The
Bush record of six military interventions in four years is remarkable.[55]
In the invasion of Panama (Operation Just Came) in December 1989, the
Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) in January and February 1991, and
the intervention in Somalia in 1992 (Operation Restore Hope), the US was
motivated by the desire to impose order in the international system.[56]
But neither the foreign nor the defense policy of the Clinton
administration is yet well defined.[57] Through the 1992 presidential
campaign, Clinton emphasized the following new priorities for the post-Cold
War American foreign policy: (1) to relink foreign and domestic policies;
(2) the reassertion of “the moral principles most Americans share”; (3) to
understand that American security is largely economic.[58] He also
campaigned for the restructuring US military forces. The new military force
must be capable of: (1) nuclear deterrence; (2) rapid deployment; (3)
technology; and (4) better intelligence.[59]
As president, Clinton directed Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to
conduct a review of military requirements. In September 1, 1993, the
Clinton administration’s first defense planning document named “Bottom-Up
Review” (BUR) was announced. The BUR identifies four major sources of
danger to US security: (1) aggression instigated by major regional powers;
(2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (3) the failure of
former communist states to make a succesful transition to democracy; (4) a
failure to maintain a strong and growing US economic base.[60] (Recently,
one more danger has been added: “transnational threats.”[61] The BUR offers
a force structure oriented around three general missions: (1) waging two
“nearly simultaneous” major regional conflicts (the two-MRC requirement);
(2) conducting peace operations; and (3) maintaining forward presence in
areas where the US has vital interests.[62] The BUR accords significant
weight to maintaining the overseas military presence of US forces in sizing
America’s post-Cold War force structure. The plan is to retain roughly
100,000 troops in Europe and some 98,000 troops in East Asia.[63]
The BUR received a lot of criticims since it was announced. “There is no logical flow from the “top” - political guidance based on the imperative to protect US interests in a new security environment - to the “bottom”, i.e., planned forces.”[64] The other problem that “there are grounds for suspecting that the force structure selected for the late 1990s is geared more to meet fiscal goals than strategic ones.”[65]
So, it is obvious that the end of the Cold War was not the end of the
threats for US national security , and not the end of the problems for the
US defense planners. More, it seems that it was easier to deal with one big
threat rather than with a complex of relatively small threats.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Brown, S., The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States
Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983)
2. Clark, M.T., ‘The Future of Clinton’s Foreign and Defense Policy:
Multilateral Security’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.13, 1994, pp.181-195
3. Foerster, Sch., ‘The United States as a World Power: An Overview’, in
Foerster, Sch. and Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990) pp.165-187
4. Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)
5. Gray, C.S., ‘Off the Map: Defense Planning After the Soviet Threat’,
Strategic Review, Spring 1994, pp.26-35
6.Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., American Foregn Policy: Pattern and
Process (3rd. ed. London: Macmillan, 1987)
7. Korb, L.J., ‘The United States’, in Murray, D.J. and Viotti, P.R.
(eds.), The Defense Policies of Nations (3rd. ed. Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp.19-56
8. Krepinevich, A.F., ‘The Clinton Defense Program: Assessing the Bottom-Up
Review’, Strategic Review, Spring 1994, pp.15-25
9.Leffler, M.P., ‘National Security and US Foreign Policy’, in Leffler,
M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International
History (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.15-52
10. Nitze, P.H., ‘Grand Strategy Then and Now: NSC-68 and its Lessons for
the Future’, Strategic Review, Winter 1994, pp.12-19
11. Sullivan, R.S., ‘Dealing with the Soviets’, in Foerster, Sch. and
Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed. Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp.165-187
12. Trachtenberg, M., ‘American Policy and Shifting Nuclear Balance’, in
Leffler, M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An
International History (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.107-122
13. Walker, M., The Cold War: And the Making of the Modern World (London:
Vintage, 1994)
14. Williams, Ph., ‘U.S. Defense Policy’, in Baylis, J., Booth, K.,
Garnett, J., and Williams, Ph., Contemporary Strategy. Volume 2: The
Nuclear Powers (2nd. ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), pp.28-55
-----------------------
[1] Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy: Pattern and
Process (3rd. ed. London: Macmillan, 1987), p.56
[2] Korb, L.J., ‘The United States’, in Murray, D.J. and Viotti, P.R.
(eds.), The Defense Policies of Nations (3rd. ed. Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1994), p.30
[3] Foerster, Sch., ‘The United States as a World Power: An Overview’, in
Foerster, Sch. and Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p.152
[4] Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of
Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), p.10
[5] Ibid., p.18
[6] Brown, S., The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States
Foreign Policy from Truman To Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983), p.31
[7] Ibid., p.34
[8] Leffler, M.P., ‘National Security and US Foreign Policy’, in Leffler,
M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International
History (London: Routledge, 1994), p.23
[9] Walker, M., The Cold War: And the Making of the Modern World (London:
Vintage, 1994), p.59
[10] Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.56
[11] Ibid., p.58
[12] Ibid., p.58
[13] Sullivan, R.S., ‘Dealing with the Soviets’, in Foerster, Sch. and
Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed. Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1990), p.165
[14] Ibid., p.169
[15] Ibid., p.170
[16] Leffler, M.P., op.cit., p.34
[17] Nitze, P.H., ‘Grand Strategy Then and Now: NSC-68 and its Lessons for
the Future’, Strategic Review, Winter 1994, p.16
[18] Trachtenberg, M., ‘American Policy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance’,
in Leffler, M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An
International History (London: Routledge, 1994), p.113
[19] Williams, Ph., ‘US Defense Policy’, in Baylis, J., Booth, K., Garnett,
J., and Williams, Ph., Contemporary Strategy. Volume 2: The Nuclear Powers
(2nd. ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), p.34
[20] Brown, S., op.cit., p.58
[21] Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.27
[22] Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.172
[23] Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.83
[24] Ibid., p.83
[25] Ibid., p.84
[26] Ibid., p.84
[27] Ibid., p.86
[28] Ibid., p.109
[29] Williams, Ph., op.cit., p.29
[30] Walker, M., op.cit., p.171
[31] Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.61
[32] Ibid., p.63
[33] Gaddis, J.L., op.cit., p.289
[34] Ibid., p.298
[35] Ibid., pp.289-292
[36] Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.177
[37] Gaddis, J.L., op.cit., p.295
[38] Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.25
[39] Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.179
[40] Ibid., p.181
[41] Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.65
[42] Ibid., p.65
[43] Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.181
[44] Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.95
[45] Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.182
[46] Ibid., p.184
[47] Walker, M., op.cit., p.290
[48] Ibid., p.294
[49] Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.184
[50] Walker, M., op.cit., p.300
[51] Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.185
[52] Ibid., p.185
[53] Walker, M., op.cit., p.326
[54] Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.30
[55] Walker, M., op.cit., p.340
[56] Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.54
[57] Clark, M.T., ‘The Future of Clinton’s Foreign and Defense Policy:
Multilateral Security’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.13, 1994, p.181
[58] Ibid., p.182
[59] Ibid., pp. 184-185
[60] Krepinevich, A.F., ‘The Clinton Defense Program: Assessing the Bottom-
Up Review’, Strategic Review, Spring 1994, p.16
[61] Gray, C.S., ‘Off the Mapp: Defense Planning After the Soviet Threat’,
Strategic Review, Spring 1994, p.31
[62] Krepinevich, A.F., op.cit., p.16
[63] Ibid., p.21
[64] Ibid., p.34
[65] Gray, C.S., op.cit., p.33
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